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Abstract
Information technology (IT) security has emerged as an important issue in e-commerce. Firms typically employ
multiple security technologies such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS) to secure their IT
systems. An assessment of the value of these technologies is crucial for firms to design the optimal architecture.
Such assessments are also useful to security technology developers in focusing their design efforts. We describe
in this report our ongoing research in economic modeling of IT security management. Specifically we describe
the technologies used in a typical IT security architecture, a game theoretical model of the significant aspects
of the architecture, preliminary analysis of the model, and our current and future work. Our research, when
completed, will yield guidelines that will help security technology deployment firms make their investment
decisions and security technology developers make their design decisions.
1 INTRODUCTION
Increased interconnectivity among computers enabled by networking technologies, in particular the Internet, has boosted the scale
and scope of information technology (IT) related crimes (Denning 2000).  As electronic commerce continues to grow, so does
cyber crime.  IT security, which was once an overhead to a companys main operation, is now widely recognized as an important
aspect of business operations (Cagnemi 2001) for all types of organizations.
IT security management seeks to manage the risks associated with IT assets such as loss, disruption, and unauthorized access of
information and system resources. Firms employ several different mechanisms internally to secure their IT systems. Internal
mechanisms fall into three major categories:  preventive, detective, and response. Preventive mechanisms like firewalls allow only
authorized traffic between the internal system and the external world. Preventive mechanisms aim to develop a defensive shield
around IT systems to secure them.  Detective mechanisms like intrusion detection systems (IDS) try to detect the intrusions when
they occur by analyzing the log files to detect suspicious system use. Response mechanisms are the more detailed investigations,
typically manual, of system use patterns to detect and confirm, as well as stop, illegal use of the system.  A firms internal
mechanisms work in conjunction with external mechanisms, such as the laws and regulations enacted by governments, which act
as a broad deterrent against IT-related crime. 
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1Recently Gordon et al. (2002) argued the need for such research.
2See Cavusoglu et al. (2002) for an alternate approach based on the market valuation of firms.
3In this study, we are interested in only perimeter security. Therefore, we are modeling attacks against internal systems. Attacks occurring
during transmission, for instance, are not addressed.
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Despite the importance of IT security to firms, researchers in the information systems area have not analyzed the issue from an
economic perspective.1  Research on IT security in engineering disciplines has focused on security technology, such as intrusion
detection and firewall algorithms. An assessment of the economic value of IT security controls is critical to firms that deploy
security technology as well as firms that develop the technology. Firms that deploy security technology require such assessments
in order to make investment decisions. Firms that develop security technology require such assessments in order to focus their
efforts on design parameters that offer the highest value to deploying firms.   
Our ongoing research is aimed at deriving guidelines about and insights into the economic value of IT security mechanisms.
Quantification of the value of IT security architecture requires an analytical model.2  We seek a model that captures the essence
of the IT security architecture and that is tractable. In order to develop the analytical model, we performed an extensive research
of IT security technologies (Cavusoglu et al. 2001). A high level classification of the technologies based on only their function
within the security architecture is insufficient to model the relevant parameters that affect their value. We studied processes
underlying these technologies and abstracted the relevant parameters that measure their effectiveness.  
In this research in progress report, we describe the problem, a model to analyze the problem, and preliminary analysis of the
model. We consider a firm that deploys IT security to minimize its expected loss. We seek to answer the following specific
research questions in this context.  (1) What is the reduction in organizational loss, i.e., value, because of a security technology?
(2) What is the optimal level of investment in each of these technologies?  (3) What is the impact of cost and quality of technology
on the optimal security architecture?
2 IT SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Figure 1 shows a typical IT security architecture consisting of multiple layers of controls.3  The technology deployed in each layer
has different capabilities and characteristics. The outermost layer consists of firewalls as preventive controls to filter out
unauthorized external traffic. The middle layer consists of intrusion detection mechanisms to detect unauthorized use of the system
by both insiders and hackers who have successfully cracked the firewalls. The bottom layer consists of detailed investigations
both to detect intrusions and in response to detection by the middle layer.
Firewalls are network access control devices that attempt to prevent intrusions from external hackers. They can be configured to
allow traffic based on the service requested, the IP address of the source or destination, or the ID of the user requesting the service
(Maiwald 2001). During firewall configuration, the security administrator defines traffic from outside that should be allowed by
firewalls. Firewalls use two types of mechanisms.  A packet-filtering mechanism performs filtering based on a set of rules encoded
in an access control list. The rules may be based on source or destination address, protocol, port number, or other data found in
the packet header. The filters read the Internet Protocol (IP) header of each packet received by the firewall. If header data satisfies
the rules, the packet is allowed; otherwise it is dropped. A limitation of this mechanism is that criteria based solely on header
information do not provide the precision of control that many organizations need (Krause and Tipton 1999).  An application layer
mechanism uses proxies. Each proxy checks not only the header information but also the service requested by the packet. Proxies
allow the precision level of the control to be fine-tuned, but they have limitations. In the absence of a proxy, the user is denied
access to that application. Typically firms use both of these mechanisms to control external traffic. The effectiveness of a firewall
is measured by two parameters: the extent to which they (1) leak disallowed traffic and (2) stop valid traffic. 
An IDS attempts to detect intrusions by analyzing audit trails that store event histories and network packets. An IDS runs
continually in the background and generates an alarm when it detects something it considers suspicious, anomalous, or illegal.
There are two primary mechanisms that an IDS uses to analyze events in order to detect attacks:  Signature-based detection and
anomaly detection (McHugh et al. 2000). Signature-based detection matches a predefined pattern of events, called a signature,
associated with a known attack but fails when the attack pattern is new. Anomaly detection techniques use a normal activity
profile for a system and flag all system states varying from the established profile in a statistically significant manner thus  iden-
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Figure 1.  IT Security Architecture
tifying abnormal behavior. The normal activity profiles are constructed typically from historical data. Unfortunately, anomaly
detection often produces a large number of false alarms, as normal patterns of users and system behavior can vary widely.
However, unlike signature-based IDS, anomaly-based IDS are capable of detecting unseen attacks.  Like firewalls, IDS are not
perfect. The effectiveness of an IDS is measured using two parameters: the likelihoods of (1) giving a signal upon an intrusion
and (2) being silent in case of no intrusion. 
Following a signal from the IDS, a security analyst examines audit trails and log files of system resources to determine if there
is a real intrusion and, if so, the type and the extent of the intrusion. If an intrusion is confirmed by the investigation, appropriate
corrective measures are undertaken to limit further damage and recover, if possible, the damage already incurred.
It should be emphasized that the above security architecture works within the external legal framework of penalties and
punishments that deters unauthorized use. The value of security control at any level depends critically on this legal framework
as well as other controls surrounding it.  Multiple layers of security are necessitated by the fact that many of the security controls
Cavusoglu et al./Optimal Design of IT Security Architecture
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respect to d will give some implications even if the point estimate for damage is incorrect.
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are imprecise. The costs associated with false positives and false negatives affect the value of a security control significantly. The
security controls at different levels may also substitute and complement other controls. The cost structures associated with security
mechanisms at different levels can be sharply different. These characteristics require that a firm simultaneously design all layers
for optimal security.
The strategic nature of the problem is another dimension that needs to be considered when dealing with security. Soon after a new
security technology is developed, hackers often figure out the loopholes and weaknesses of the technology and how it can be
broken. Hackers do not select organizations randomly. They attack IT systems that are vulnerable and do not have appropriate
controls. In essence, they strategically choose their victims and actions. A good illustration of the strategic game played by the
security experts in a firm and the hackers is provided at http://www.msnbc.com/modules/hack_attack/hach.swf.
3 MODEL
Consider a firm interested in setting up its security architecture. The optimal design of security architecture depends on the extent
of expected damage d  that hackers can inflict on the firm and is known to both the firm and the intruder.4  Most firms estimate
possible damages along with their likelihoods in the IT security risk assessment phase (Peltier 2001).  We assume that g  fraction
of traffic comes from external users, and (1  g) fraction originates from internal users.  . fraction of external traffic comes from
unauthorized users. These are supposed to be stopped at firewalls. Firewalls are not perfect. We model the effectiveness of the




unauthorized external user. We assume that the firewall performs better than random guessing, so  lies between 0.5 and 1.1
Fq








All internal users are authorized users of the system. However, they as well as authorized external users can misuse the system
by improperly accessing data or programs they are not authorized to use. A fraction 8 of the authorized users is assumed to be
dishonest. The second layer controls, IDS, are also not perfect. We model the effectiveness of the IDS through two parameters 1
Iq
and . The parameter  denotes the probability that the IDS gives a warning signal whenever an intrusion occurs. We assume2
Iq 1
Iq
that  lies between 0.5 and 1. Sometimes the system classifies an action as anomalous when it is a legitimate action.   is the1
Iq 2
Iq
probability that there is no signal when there is no intrusion.  is also assumed to be between 0.5 and 1.2
Iq
Following a signal from the IDS, an investigation is needed to determine the type and extent of the attack, if it is a true attack.
The firm incurs a cost of c each time it monitors the audit trail of a user for a possible intrusion.  Manual monitoring done by the
firm may not detect intrusion with certainty. This imperfection of monitoring is captured by an effectiveness parameter ", the
probability with which monitoring detects a true intrusion. If manual monitoring detects the intrusion, the firm recovers a fraction
of the damage by the intruder without any additional cost. This fraction is captured by the parameter, N.
Previous studies have shown that incentives for intruders are usually not related only to financial gains (Koerner 1999). We
assume that when a hacker breaks into the system he gets a fixed utility of ì. If the intrusion is discovered, the hacker incurs a
penalty. The penalty is composed of two components: A fixed penalty $  and a variable penalty proportional to the expected
amount of damage, (d (Nicholson et al. 2000). We assume that prices of security controls increase in their effectiveness. The price
of the firewall is captured by  whereas the price of the IDS is in the form of1 1 2 2( 0.5) ( 0.5)
F Fz q z q− + −
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5A type 1 error is incurred when the security control fails to detect the unauthorized activity:  letting an unauthorized external user into the
system in the case of a firewall and not giving a signal for hacking activity in the case of an IDS.  On the other hand, a type 2 error is incurred
when the security control detects something that it is not supposed to detect:  not letting an authorized external user into the system in the case
of a firewall and giving a signal for non-hacking activity in the case of an IDS.
6This model assumes that hackers do not select their victims randomly. The notion of strategic interaction requires the hacker to spend some
time to determine which firms are vulnerable and worth attacking. The inclusion of such pre-hacking cost does not change the results and
therefore omitted.
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.  and characterize the relative costs of reducing type 1 and  type 2 errors in the firewall and1 1 2 2( 0.5) ( 0.5)
I Iw q w q− + − iz iw
the IDS, respectively.5
4 MODEL ANALYSIS
Figure 2 depicts the game tree we use for analyzing firm and hacker strategies.  The game starts with nature selecting the type
of user, which can be external (node 1) with probability g or internal (node 4) with probability (1  g).  Node 2 represents the
unauthorized external user whereas node 3 symbolizes the authorized external user. Honest authorized users have a dominant
strategy of not hacking. A dishonest authorized user can take two actions: hack or do not hack. If he decides to hack, the game
moves to node 6, otherwise to node 7.  In the next level, the IDS tries to detect intrusions which are captured by node 6. The firm
makes decisions about whether to monitor or not based on the state (the signal or the no signal) it is in. The dashed curves in
Figure 2 enclose the information sets of the firm. The game is made up of two parts:  one in which there is a signal from the IDS
(information set I1), and one in which there is no signal from the IDS (information set I2). The firm makes decisions without
knowing exactly which node the game has reached within an information set. 
The mixed strategy space for the dishonest user is a probability distribution R {intrusion, no intrusion} ! [0,1] where R denotes
the probability of intrusion. The strategy set of the firm is a vector {monitor|no-signal, do-not monitor|no-signal,fS ∈
monitor|signal, do-not monitor|signal}. We define  as the probability of monitoring given a signal from the IDS and 10 1ρ≤ ≤ 20 1ρ≤ ≤
as the probability of monitoring given no signal. 
The objective of the hacker is to maximize his expected payoff while the firm tries to minimize organizational loss. The payoff
function for the firm is
1 2 1 2( , , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )S NF P signal F P nosignal F P drop Cost drop Cost controlsρ ρ ψ ρ ψ ρ ψ= + + +
where and  are payoff functions for signal and no signal states, respectively. Each of these payoff1( , )SF ρ ψ 2( , )NF ρ ψ
functions consists of three parts:  the loss from undetected intrusion, the loss from detected intrusion, i.e., the portion of the loss
unrecovered even if the intrusion is detected, and the monitoring cost. Cost(drop) is the cost associated with dropping external
authorized users at the firewall.  Cost(controls) is the investment cost in firewalls and IDS.
The hackers expected payoff is given below. The first part is the expected utility from the intrusion and the second part is the
expected cost if the intrusion is detected.6 
1 2 1 1 1 2( , , ) ( (1 ) ) ( )
I IH q q dρ ρ ψ ψµ ψ ρ ρ α β γ= − + − +
In order to determine optimal investment in security controls, we use backward induction. First we determine optimal response,
i.e., frequency of manual monitoring, assuming that the firm has adopted the optimal security controls in both preventive and
detective control layers. Then, using the optimal response in the last stage, we go to the first stage and decide on optimal effec-
tiveness for both firewalls and IDS simultaneously. 
We have analyzed the last stage of the game so far. The solution for this stage results in five Nash equilibria, two in mixed
strategies and three in pure strategies. We summarize these equilibria in the following proposition.
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Figure 2.  The Game Tree
Cavusoglu et al./Optimal Design of IT Security Architecture
2002  Twenty-Third International Conference on Information Systems 755
Probability of Monitoring 
when there is a signal from IDS 
Probability of Monitoring when 
there is no signal from IDS Probability of Hacking 












 2 1(1 )









 2 0ρ =  1 1
IcW qψ − Γ=
Ω
 
1 1ρ =  2 1ρ =  0ψ =  
1 0ρ =  2 0ρ =  1ψ =  
1 1ρ =  2 0ρ =  1ψ =  
Proposition 1:  Optimal Monitoring Strategy for the Firm Along with Hackers Strategy
where
1 2 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
1
2 1 2 1
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 )
(1 (1 )) 1 ( 1)
I F I I F
I F F I I F I
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W q q q q q
W q q q q q q q
d q
q c q q q d
ε ε ζ ζε
ε ε ζ ζε
αζεφ
λ ε ζ αφ
= − − + − − + −
= − − − − + −
Γ = −
   Ω = − − − + − −   
Preliminary analysis reveals that all equilibria can be succinctly characterized using the following two dimensions:  (1) benefit
to cost ratio of intrusion for the hacker and (2) cost to benefit ratio of monitoring for the firm. As the value of dimension (1)
increases and/or the value of dimension (2) decreases, the firm increases its monitoring effort while the hacker reduces his
probability of hacking.  The firm always monitors a larger or equal fraction of cases that generate signals compared to those that
did not generate a signal. These preliminary results are consistent with our intuitions. 
5 FUTURE WORK
The equilibrium that will be reached will depend on the values of parameters. Currently we are identifying the conditions for
different equilibrium. These conditions will provide insights into how the quality and cost of security architecture components
affect the hacker and firm strategies.  Further computing the organizational loss and minimizing it with respect to the quality
parameters will provide the optimal quality levels for the security components. 
We will also perform a sensitivity analysis of the optimal quality levels and organizational loss with respect to the cost parameters
to derive insights into the impact of the cost structure on the optimal security configuration. We also plan on extending our
analysis for the case when firms have a budget on IT security investment. In the future, we will extend the model using different
types of hackers (internal and external) with different utility functions and the varying amounts of damage they can inflict on
systems. 
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